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Abstract. Key chain, as an effective tool to achieve strong bid privacy non-
interactively, was employed by Watanabe and Imai in an auction scheme. But
in their scheme [13] bid privacy cannot be achieved unconditionally and losing
bidders must trust bidders with higher bids for privacy of their bids. Moreover,
their scheme is not efficient. In this paper the key chain in [13] is optimised to
achieve unconditional bid privacy. In the new scheme, every losing bidder can
control privacy of their own bids while no trust is needed. Computational cost
of this scheme is optimised to avoid the costly verifiable encryption technique in
[13] by applying homomorphic encryption.
1 Introduction
Sealed-bid auction is an ideal method to distribute merchandise. In sealed-bid auctions
each bidder seals his bid (by encryption or hash function) and submits it before a set
time. After that time the bids are opened and the winning price and winner are deter-
mined according to a pre-defined auction rule. Compared to other types of auction, such
as open-cry auction, sealed-bid auction is more suitable in network environment. There-
fore sealed-bid auction has been attracting most attention in the research of e-auction.
In many auction applications it is desired to keep the losing bids private even at the end
of the auction. This requirement is called bid privacy and is discussed in many papers.
Watanabe and Imai presented a non-interactive sealed-bid auction scheme [13],
which provides privacy for the losing bids. The essential idea in this scheme is a tech-
nique called key chain. The advantage of that scheme is bid privacy is obtained non-
interactively (the bidders need not participate in opening the bids after they submit their
bids). The authors claimed that they provided satisfactory bid privacy (“. . . prevent even
an auctioneer from getting any useful information of bids of losers . . . ”).
However the bid privacy in this scheme is achieved based on strong trust (either a
fraction of bidders, the auctioneer or a third party must be trusted). In other word, a
losing bid can be revealed by a cooperation of the auctioneer and all the bidders with
higher bids. This kind of bid privacy is actually not strong or satisfactory. Moreover this
scheme is not efficient in computation.
In this paper a new scheme is presented. The idea of key chain is inherited, but the
key chain is constructed in a different way, so that bid privacy for a losing bidder is
achieved without any trust on other parties. Namely, without the cooperation of a losing
bidder his bid is private. Additionally, the new scheme is simpler as the third party T
and the auctioneer A are removed. As a result, communication in the proposed scheme
is more efficient than in [13]. Moreover, optional techniques to improve computation
efficiency are also introduced in the new scheme.
1.1 Desired Properties in Sealed-bid Auction
There are several properties that are usually desired in e-auction schemes [?,?,12]. Their
definitions are as follows.
1. Correctness: If every party acts honestly, the correct winning price and winner(s)
are determined according to the auction rules.
2. Soundness: If an auction result is declared, it is a correct result even though there
are some dishonest parties.
3. Fairness: No bidder can take advantage over other bidders. It includes:
– No bidder knows anything about other bidders’ bids before he submits his own
bid.
– After a bidder submits his bid, the bid cannot be modified.
– No bidder can deny his bid after he submits it. This is sometimes called non-
repudiation of bids.
4. Bid Privacy: The losing bids remain confidential until the end of the auction even
to the auctioneers.
5. Public verifiability: The validity of the result of the auction is publicly verifiable
by anyone.
6. High Efficiency: Computation and communication must be efficienct enough for
applications.
1.2 Symbols and Outline
G is a cyclic group with a generator g. There are n bidders B1, B2, . . . , Bn and w
biddable prices p1, p2, . . . , pw from highest to lowest. Ea(b) denotes encryption of b by
a public key a. Da(b) denotes decryption of b by a private key a. Siga(b) denotes a’s
signature on b. V Ea(b) is verifiable encryption of b by a’s key.
In section 2, related auction schemes are introduced. In section 3, the scheme by
Watanabe and Imai is reviewed and analysed. In section 4, our new scheme is presented.
In section 5, the security of our scheme is analysed. In section 6, efficiency improvement
for our scheme is discussed.
2 Related Work
Bid privacy is a frequently desired property in auction schemes. It refers to the con-
fidentiality of losing bids to anybody even after the auction ends. In current auction
schemes, two methods are often applied to implement bid privacy.
The first method is to trust some parties to conceal the losing bids. To strengthen
bid privacy, the trust is often shared among a few auctioneers, so that bid privacy can be
achieved if the number of honest parties is over a threshold. This mechanism is usually
realized by sharing the capability of bid-opening among several auctioneers and requir-
ing the cooperation of a portion of them to open the bids. Several published schemes
are in this category [4, 6, 3, 5, 1, 8]. [4, 6] employ standard threshold secret sharing tech-
nique. [3] employs a special 2 − 2 secret sharing. [5] also employs threshold secret
sharing, but uses the degree of polynomials to stand for a bid. [1, 8] employ distributed
decryption technique. [1] employs standard threshold distributed decryption. [8] em-
ploys only two auctioneers and is in fact 2-2 distributed decryption if bid decryption
is defined as interpreting the meaning of bids in auction schemes. The disadvantage of
this method is that the bid privacy obtained is not strong enough.
In some applications stronger bid privacy is required. The strongest is uncondi-
tional bid privacy—without the cooperation of a losing bidder, his bid is confidential. A
mechanism called Dutch style bid opening can be employed to achieve unconditional
bid privacy. In this mechanism the bids are opened downwards from the highest bid-
dable price, which is quite like the strategy in Dutch auction. After the winning bid
is found in a downward search, cooperation from the bidders is not available, so any
losing bidder’s bid is kept private without trust on anybody else. Therefore, very strong
absolute privacy is achieved. The disadvantage of this method is low efficiency. The
scheme is interactive and inefficient in computation. Classic schemes in this category
include [11], [10] and [12].
A scheme by Watanabe and Imai [13] was claimed to achieve strong bid privacy
non-interactively. A cryptographic tool, key chain, is employed in this scheme. The bids
are opened in a downward direction from the highest biddable price until the winning
bid is found. Bid opening is non-interactive, which is an advantage over [11], [10] and
[12]. However, bid privacy in [13] is not very strong.
3 Auction Scheme Based on Key Chain
3.1 Key chain
In [13] only a finite set of prices are biddable and a key chain is constructed for these
prices. The principle of key chain is as follows.
1. At each price all the bids are encrypted by the same public key, which is generated
by all the bidders.
2. The corresponding decrypting key is shared among the bidders. Only when all the
bidders put their shares together at a price, the bids at that price can be opened.
3. If a bidder is not willing to pay a price, at that price his bidding value contains his
share of the decryption key needed to open the bids at the next lower price. So if
none of the bidders are willing to pay a price, the decryption key to open the bids
at the next lower price can be constructed from their opened bids at the price.
4. If a bidder is willing to pay a price, his share of the decryption key needed to open
the bids at the next lower price is not contained in the bid for the current price.
In this case the key chain is broken and the decryption key to open the bids at the
next lower price cannot be constructed, thus the confidentiality of the losing bids is
protected.
3.2 The Scheme by Watanabe and Imai
There is an active auctioneer in the scheme by Watanabe and Imai. The auctioneer
is responsible for constructing the public keys in the chain. To weaken the trust on
the bidders, a share for each decryption key is provided by the auctioneer. Moreover,
verifiable encryption is employed so that an off-line third party can interfere if a bidder
is dishonest when constructing the key chain (correct shares for next decryption key is
not in one of his bids). In this case the third party can recover the concealed correct
share to help construct the next decryption key. Their protocol is as follows.
1. Registration phase
– Bidder Bi chooses his secret share xi,j for price pj . The corresponding public
key share is yi,j = gxi,j . Additionally xi,j is encrypted as βi,j = V ET (xi,j)
by a third party T ’s public key. Watanabe and Imai adopted Naccache-Stern
encryption algorithm [7]. βi,j is recoverable by T and can be verified as a
correct encryption of the secret committed in yi,j by zero knowledge proof of
equality of logarithms [2]. Bi signs, and sends yi,j and βi,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , w
to auctioneer A.
– A verifiesBi’s signature on yi,j and βi,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , w and the correctness
of encryption. If the verification is successful, A sends a certificate certi =
(zi,1, zi,2, . . . , zi,j) to Bi where zi,j = SigA(Bi, yi,j). Then A chooses his
own secret shares xAj and generates the public keys in the chain Yj = gxAj
∏n
i=1 yi,j
for j = 1, 2, . . . , w. Finally A publishes Yj for j = 1, 2, . . . , w and the regis-
tration information of the bidders. Key generation is illustrated in Table 1 for
the case n = 3 and w = 6.
2. Bidding phase
– Bi publishes his bid Vi,j = EYj (Ii,j , yi,j , zi,j) for j = 1, 2, . . . , w. If he is
not willing to pay pj , Ii,j = (No, xi,j−1). If he is willing to pay pj , Ii,j =
(Y es, proof(xi,j−1)) where proof(xi,j−1) is a transcript for zero knowledge
proof of knowledge of xi,j−1. Ii,j can be checked against yi,j and zi,j to show
that Bi provides a valid xi,j−1 (in a “Yes” bid) or knows its value (in a “No”
bid). Bid format is illustrated in Table 2 (supposing there are 3 bidders and 5
biddable prices).
3. Opening phase
– Bi publishes xi,1, yi,1 and zi,1.
– A calculates and publishes X1 = xA1 +
∑n
i=1 xi,1, the decryption key for the
bids at p1.
– If no “Yes” bid is found at this price, decryption key for p2 can be constructed
and opening continues. Similarly the opening can go on along the key chain
until a “yes” bid is found as winning bid and the key chain is broken.
3.3 Problems in the Scheme by Watanabe and Imai
Among the desired properties introduced in 1.1, bid privacy and high efficiency cannot
be achieved satisfactorily.
A B1 B2 B3 encryption key
evaluation p2 p3 p5
p1 g
xA1 y1,1 = g
x1,1 y2,1 = g
x2,1 y3,1 = g
x3,1 Y1 = g
xA1 × y1,1 × y2,1 × y3,1
p2 g
xA2 y1,2 = g
x1,2 y2,2 = g
x2,2 y3,2 = g
x3,2 Y2 = g
xA2 × y1,2 × y2,2 × y3,2
p3 g
xA3 y1,3 = g
x1,3 y2,3 = g
x2,3 y3,3 = g
x3,3 Y3 = g
xA3 × y1,3 × y2,3 × y3,3
p4 g
xA4 y1,4 = g
x1,4 y2,4 = g
x2,4 y3,4 = g
x3,4 Y4 = g
xA4 × y1,4 × y2,4 × y3,4
p5 g
xA5 y1,5 = g
x1,5 y2,5 = g
x2,5 y3,5 = g
x3,5 Y5 = g
xA5 × y1,5 × y2,5 × y3,5
p6 g
xA6 y1,6 = g
x1,6 y2,6 = g
x2,6 y3,6 = g
x3,6 Y6 = g
xA6 × y1,6 × y2,6 × y3,6
Table 1. Key generation in the scheme by Watanabe and Imai
B1 B2 B3 A constructing decryption key
evaluation p2 p3 p5
p1 Ey1 (x1,2) Ey1 (x2,2) Ey1 (x3,2) X1 = xA1 + x1,1 + x2,1 + x3,1
p2 Ey2 (proof(x1,3)) Ey2 (x2,3) Ey2 (x3,3) X2 = xA2 + x1,2 + x2,2 + x3,2
p3 Ey3 (x1,4) Ey3 (proof(x2,4)) Ey3 (x3,4) B1 andA must collude
to recoverX3
p4 Ey4 (x1,5) Ey4 (x2,5) Ey4 (x3,5) B1 ,B2 andA must
collude to recoverX4
p5 Ey5 (x1,6) Ey5 (x2,6) Ey5 (proof(x3,6)) B1 ,B2 andA must
collude to recoverX5
p6 Ey6 (x1,1) Ey6 (x2,1) Ey6 (x3,1) B1 ,B2 ,B3 andA
must collude to recoverX6
Table 2. Bids in the scheme by Watanabe and Imai
Since A provides a share for each decryption key the trust for bid privacy is shared
among not only the bidders but also A. Namely the trust needed for the privacy of the
i+1th highest bid is shared among the bidders submitting the highest i bids and A. As
a result, weaker trust is required, however bid privacy is still conditional and the scheme
is still unfair for bidders with lower bids.
Because verifiable encryption enables T to recover a secret share once he gets its
encrypted value, registration information from bidders must be transmitted through a
confidential channel (this was not stated by Watanabe and Imai). Even though the reg-
istration information is encrypted, collusion of A and T still can reveal all decryption
keys and thus all losing bids. That means bid privacy is based on the following two
assumptions
1. A and the winner do not conspire,
2. A and T do not conspire.
These are still strong assumptions and require strong trust.
Inefficiency is also a problem. The number of opening rounds is linear in the number
of biddable prices and the computational cost of each round is linear in the number of
bidders. Therefore O(nw) exponentiations are needed in opening phase where n is the
number of bidders and w is the number of biddable prices. Moreover because an active
auctioneer is involved in key chain construction and verifiable encryption is employed,
computation and communication in registration phase are also costly.
Another issue affecting efficiency is bid padding. Every bidder’s highest positive
bid (transcript of a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge) in a different
format from other bids (encryption of an integer less than the order of G, which is in
G when ElGamal encryption algorithm is employed). As the highest positive bids are
much longer, other bids must be padded to the same length to make the encrypted bids
indistinguishable from one another, although padding was not mentioned in the paper
by Watanabe and Imai. This increases the communication burden of the scheme.
4 New Scheme
We want unconditional bid privacy, namely no trust is needed on any other party for
the confidentiality of a losing bidder’s bid. In the new scheme when there is a winning
bid, the key chain is broken completely. One solution is to construct the key chain
according to a rule: if a bidder has a positive bid at a price, he does not have a share of
the decryption key for the next lower price. His share is actually shared again among all
the bidders. So the public keys are generated in a special way so that the share for the
decryption key at the winning price to the winner can only be extracted by a cooperation
of all the bidders. Therefore any decryption key at a price lower than the winning price
cannot be reconstructed without cooperation of all bidders. The modified key chain is
illustrated in Figure 1 in an example where the fourth highest bid is the winning bid.
To obtain a simpler and more effective and efficient scheme, no active auctioneer is
employed and no registration phase is needed in our scheme. Nor does it need a third
party or verifiable encryption. Bidders performing malicious behaviour (e.g. failing to
reveal correct share in a “No” bid) can be publicly identified. Our scheme includes four
phases: initial phase, pre-bidding phase, bidding phase and opening phase.
Fig. 1. Modified key chain
B1 B2 B3 encryption key
evaluation p2 p3 p5
p1 y1,1 = g
x1,1 y2,1 = g
x2,1 y3,1 = g
x3,1 Y1 = y1,1 × y2,1 × y3,1
p2 y1,2 = g
x1,2 y2,2 = g
x2,2 y3,2 = g
x3,2 Y2 = y1,2 × y2,2 × y3,2
p3 y1,3 = g
r1y2y3 y2,3 = g
x2,3 y3,3 = g
x3,3 Y3 = y1,3 × y2,3 × y3,3
p4 any y1,4 in G y2,4 = gr2y1y3 y3,4 = gx3,4 Y4 = y1,4 × y2,4 × y3,4
p5 any y1,5 in G any y2,5 in G y3,5 = gx3,5 Y5 = y1,5 × y2,5 × y3,5
p6 any y1,6 in G any y2,6 in G y3,6 = gr3y1y2 Y6 = y1,6 × y2,6 × y3,6
Table 3. Key generation in our scheme
1. Initial phase:
Each bidderBi chooses a secret xi and publishesCom1i = (Bi, yi, SigBi(Bi, yi))
where yi = gxi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n on a bulletin board.
2. Pre-bidding phase:
Every bidder publishes a public key for every biddable price. If a bidder Bi is not
willing to pay pj , his public key for pj+1 is yi,j+1 = gxi,j+1 where the corre-
sponding secret key xi,j+1 is kept as a secret. If bidder Bi’s bidding price is pj , his
public key for pj+1 is yi,j+1 = gri
∏n
k=1,k 6=i yk where ri is kept as a secret and he
chooses public keys yi,j+2, yi,j+3, . . . , yi,n randomly for pj+2, pj+3, . . . , pn.
Bi publishes Com2i = (Bi, yi,1, yi,2, . . . , yi,w, SigBi(Bi, yi,1, yi,2, . . . , yi,w))
on the bulletin board. Key generation is illustrated in Table 3 (supposing there are
3 bidders and 6 biddable prices). The public key for price pj is Yj =
∏n
k=1 yk,j
and can be calculated by anybody using the public values available on the bulletin
board.
3. Bidding phase:
Every bidder submits a bid for each biddable price. If a bidder Bi is not will-
ing to pay pj , his bid at pj is Vi,j = EYj (xi,j+1). If Bi is willing to pay pj ,
Vi,j = EYj (ri). At price pj lower than his evaluation, Vi,j is randomly chosen. Bi
publishes
Vi = (Bi, Vi,1, Vi,2, . . . , Vi,w, SigBi(Bi, Vi,1, Vi,2, . . . , Vi,w)) on the bulletin
board. Bid format is illustrated in Table 4 (supposing there are 3 bidders and 6
biddable prices).
4. Opening phase:
The bidders publish Com3i = (xi,1, SigBi(xi,1)) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Anybody
can verify the validity of the shares against yi,1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, construct the
decryption key for the first price X1 =
∑n
k=1 xk,1 and decrypt all the bids at
p1. The meaning of Bi’s decrypted bid vi,1 can be determined by testing whether
yi,2 = gvi,1 (vi,1 is negative bid) or yi,2 = gvi,1
∏n
k=1,k 6=i yk (vi,1 is positive bid).
If there is no bid showing willingness to pay at p1, all the shares xi,2 = vi,1 for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n are obtained and X2 =
∑n
k=1 xk,2 can be recovered. Then all the
bids at p2 are opened. The opening continues until yi,j+1 6= gvi,j is met and the
key chain breaks at pj+1. If yi,j+1 = gvi,j
∏n
k=1 yk, pj and Bi are declared as
winning price and winner. Otherwise Bi is identified as a cheater.
B1 B2 B3 construction of decryption key
evaluation p2 p3 p5
p1 EY1(x1,2) EY1(x2,2) EY1(x3,2) X1 = x1,1 + x2,1 + x3,1
p2 EY2(r1) EY2(x2,3) EY2(x3,3) X2 = x1,2 + x2,2 + x3,2
p3 any bid EY3(r2) EY3(x3,4) B2 and B3 must
in correct format collude to recover X3
p4 any bid any bid EY4(x3,5) all the bidders must
in correct format in correct format collude to recover X4
p5 any bid any bid EY5(r3) all the bidders must
in correct format in correct format collude to recover X5
p6 random bid random bid random bid all the bidders must
in correct format in correct format in correct format collude to recover X6
Table 4. Bids in our scheme
Figure 2 illustrates the auction procedure.
5 Analysis
The new auction scheme is analysed in this section in relation to the properties from
section 1.1. It will be shown that the scheme is correct, sound, fair, publicly verifiable
and achieves unconditional privacy for losing bids.
1. Correctness:
An honest bidder Bi publishes xi,1 = loggyi,1. So X1 =
∑n
k=1 xk,1 = loggY1 can
be reconstructed. Therefore the key chain starts correctly and the bids at p1 can be
opened. An honest bidder Bi’s bids at all the biddable prices are as follows
(a) At a price pj no lower than his evaluation, his bid is xi,j+1 satisfying yi,j+1 =
gxi,j+1 .
(b) At a price pj equal to his evaluation, his bid is ri satisfying yi,j+1 = gri
∏n
k=1,k 6=i yk.
(c) At a price pj lower than his evaluation, his bid is a random value.
If at a price pj higher than any bidder’s evaluation bids are opened, the decrypted
bids are vi,j = xi,j+1 = loggyi,j+1 for i = 1, 2 . . . , n, thusXj+1 =
∑n
k=1 xk,j+1 =
loggYj+1 can be reconstructed. So the key chain extends correctly one step down-
wards and the bids at pj+1 can be opened. Namely as far as all the opened bids
are as expressed in (a) above, the key chain can extend on. Therefore if no bidder
Procedure of Auction
Initial Phase
1. Bi - BB∗




2. Bi - BB
Com2i = (Bi, yi,1, yi,2, . . . , yi,w, SigBi(Bi, yi,1, yi,2, . . . , yi,w))
negative bid: yi,j+1 = gxi,j+1




3. Bi - BB
Vi = (Bi, Vi,1, Vi,2, . . . , Vi,w, SigBi(Bi, Vi,1, Vi,2, . . . , Vi,w))
negative bid: Vi,j = EYj (xi,j+1)
positive bid: Vi,j = EYj (ri)
Opening Phase
4. Bi - BB
Com3i = (xi,1, SigBi(xi,1))




Decryption: vi,j = DXj (Vi,j)
If gvi,j = yi,j+1, Vi,j is a negative bid
If gvi,j = yi,j+1/(
∏n
k=1,k 6=i yk), Vi,j is a positive bid and opening stops.




vi,j is constructed and opening continues.
* BB: bulletin board
Fig. 2. optimistic auction procedure
has an evaluation no lower than the lowest biddable price, the key chain extends
ultimately to pw and the item on sale is not sold. Otherwise vi,j = ri satisfying
yi,j+1 = gri
∏n
k=1,k 6=i yk must be met for some i and j. In this case pj is the
winning price and Bi is the winner.
2. Soundness:
As the number of biddable prices is finite, extension of the key chain must stop
somewhere.
(a) If the key chain extends to pw and no winner is found, yi,j+1 = gDXj (Vi,j)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , w − 1. Since yi,j+1 and Vi,j for i =
1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , w − 1 are signed by Bi, they are generated by
Bi if the signature algorithm is secure. So no bidder submits a positive bid no
lower than the lowest biddable price.
(b) If pu and Bv are declared as winning price and winner, yi,j+1 = gDXj (Vi,j) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, j = 1, 2, . . . , u− 1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , v− 1, v+1, v+2 . . . , n,
j = u. Since yi,j+1 and Vi,j for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , u are signed
by Bi, they are generated by Bi if the signature algorithm is secure. So pu and
Bv are winning price and winner.
(c) If Bi is declared as a cheater, the key chain must be broken at a price pu and
yi,j+1 = g
DXj (Vi,j) for j = 1, 2, . . . , u − 2 and yi,u 6= gDXu−1 (Vi,u−1) and
yi,u 6= gDXu−1 (Vi,u−1)
∏n
k=1,k 6=i yk. Since yi,j+1 and Vi,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , u−
1 are signed by Bi, they are generated by Bi if the signature algorithm is se-
cure. So Bi is a cheater.
3. Fairness:
– First it is illustrated that before the opening phase, no bids are revealed. Before
the opening phase only every bidder’s public keys and bids for each price are
published. The public keys are generated in two methods. In the first method
a bidder Bi chooses a secret key xi,j randomly for pl and the public key is
yi,j = gxi,j . Since xi,j is chosen from 1, 2, 3, . . . , ord(G) randomly, yi,j has
a identical distribution over G. In the second Bi chooses a random value ri
for pl and the public key is yi,j = gri
∏n
k=1,k 6=i yk. Since ri is chosen from
1, 2, 3, . . . , ord(G) randomly, yi,j has a identical distribution over G too. In
both cases all the public keys are in identical distribution over G, so no infor-
mation about any bidder’s bids is revealed from the public keys. All the sub-
mitted bids are encryptions of a random integer less than ord(G), thus have an
uniform distribution in the ciphertext space (G in the case of ElGamal encryp-
tion) if a semanticly secure encryption algorithm (e.g. ElGamal or Paillier’s
[9]) is employed . So no information about the bids is revealed from the en-
crypted bids although no padding operation is employed. Therefore before the
opening phase all bids are confidential on the assumption that the encryption
algorithm is semantically secure1. The only method to open any bid is to con-
struct the key chain, which requires the cooperation of all bidders and does not
happen until the opening phase.
1 An encryption algorithm is said to be semantically secure if given that ck is the encryption of
message m0 or m1, it is computationally difficult to determine which is the correct message
coresponding to ck.
– No bidder can change or deny his bid after bidding phase. A bidder Bi’s bid-




k=1,k 6=i yk. Since yi,j+1 and Vi,j are published in pre-
bidding phase and bidding phase respectively, they cannot be changed. So bid-
ding values cannot be changed. yi,j+1 and Vi,j are signed by Bi, so Bi cannot
deny his bids.
4. Public Verifiability
All the information necessary to decide the auction result is published on the bul-
letin board, so anybody can verify the auction result using the contents of the bul-
letin board.
5. Bid privacy:
The bidders with higher bids (e.g. the winner) cannot take advantage over other
bidders even after the auction result turns out, because to open any losing bid the
cooperation of all the losing bidders is necessary. When Bv is the winner and pu
is the winning price, Bv’s bid at pu is opened to be rv satisfying yv,u+1 = grv
while all the other bidders are opened as x1,u+1, x2,u+1, . . .xv−1,u+1, xv+1,u+1,
xv+2,u+1, . . .xn,u+1. If an attacker A can decrypt any losing bid at pu+1, he must
know the decryption key













on condition that the applied encryption algorithm (e.g. ElGamal or Paillier’s) is


























the attacker needs the cooperation of all the losing bidders if Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption is correct. So without cooperation of all the losing bidders all losing bids
at pu+1 are confidential. That also means no share of Xu+2 is published. Therefore
without cooperation of all the losing bidders all losing bids at pu+2 are confidential
too. Similarly all lower bids cannot be opened without cooperation of the losing
bidders. So in this fashion stronger bid privacy can be achieved in our scheme than
in the scheme by Watanabe and Imai [13].
6 Efficiency Improvement
As stated before, [13] is not efficient in computation and communication. Our scheme
improves communication efficiency greatly as bid length is much shorter in our scheme
and communication with an active auctioneer is avoided. However the scheme is still
not efficienct enough in computation.
If homomorphic encryption algorithm is employed to encrypt the bids, computa-
tional cost can be reduced. For example, assume Paillier’s encryption scheme [9] is
employed. In the appendix A, Paillier’s encryption scheme is introduced. After this
improvement, the cource of auction becomes as follows.
1. Initial phase:
Each bidderBi chooses a secret xi and publishesCom1i = (Bi, yi, SigBi(Bi, yi))
where yi = gxi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n on a bulletin board.
2. Pre-bidding phase:
Every bidder publishes a public key for every biddable price. If a bidder Bi is not
willing to pay pj , his public key for pj+1 is yi,j+1 = gxi,j+1 where the corre-
sponding secret key xi,j+1 is kept as a secret. If bidder Bi’s bidding price is pj , his
public key for pj+1 is yi,j+1 = gri
∏n
k=1,k 6=i yk where ri is kept as a secret and he
chooses public keys yi,j+2, yi,j+3, . . . , yi,n randomly for pj+2, pj+3, . . . , pn.
Bi publishes Com2i = (Bi, yi,1, yi,2, . . . , yi,w, SigBi(Bi, yi,1, yi,2, . . . , yi,w))
on the bulletin board. Key generation is illustrated in Table 3 (supposing there are
3 bidders and 6 biddable prices). The public key for price pj is Yj =
∏n
k=1 yk,j
and can be calculated by anybody using the public values available on the bulletin
board.
3. Bidding phase:
Every bidder submits a bid for each biddable price. If a bidder Bi is not will-
ing to pay pj , his bid at pj is Vi,j = EYj (xi,j+1). If Bi is willing to pay pj ,
Vi,j = EYj (ri). At price pj lower than his evaluation, Vi,j is randomly chosen. Bi
publishes
Vi = (Bi, Vi,1, Vi,2, . . . , Vi,w, SigBi(Bi, Vi,1, Vi,2, . . . , Vi,w)) on the bulletin
board. Bid format is illustrated in Table 4 (supposing there are 3 bidders and 6
biddable prices).
4. Opening phase:
The bidders publish Com3i = (xi,1, SigBi(xi,1)) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Anybody
can verify the validity of the shares against yi,1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, construct the
decryption key for the first price X1 =
∑n
k=1 xk,1 and decrypt all the bids at
p1. The meaning of Bi’s decrypted bid vi,1 can be determined by testing whether
yi,2 = gvi,1 (vi,1 is negative bid) or yi,2 = gvi,1
∏n
k=1,k 6=i yk (vi,1 is positive bid).
If there is no bid showing willingness to pay at p1, all the shares xi,2 = vi,1 for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n are obtained and X2 =
∑n
k=1 xk,2 can be recovered. Then all the
bids at p2 are opened. The opening continues until yi,j+1 6= gvi,j is met and the
key chain breaks at pj+1. If yi,j+1 = gvi,j
∏n
k=1 yk, pj and Bi are declared as
winning price and winner. Otherwise Bi is identified as a cheater.
When the decryption key Xl at price pl is recovered, the bids Vi,l for i = 1, 2, . . . n
are not opened separately. Instead




is recovered with only one decryption. There are two possibilities for X ′l+1.
1. If GX
′
l+1 = Yl+1, decryption key Xl+1 =
∑n
i=1 xi,l+1 = X
′
l+1 is recovered. That




l+1 6= Yl+1, the winning bid must be at pl. So all the bids at pl are decrypted
separately.
– If gDXl (Vi,l) = yi,l+1, Bi is not the winner.





is checked to ensure that the winner is not able to open the second highest bid.
Table-5 compares efficiency of the scheme by Watanabe and Imai, our original
scheme and our scheme after optimisation (supposing Paillier’s encryption scheme and
RSA signature are employed). Our scheme is better than [13] not only in bid privacy
but also in efficiency.
Scheme Computational cost of a Computational cost of
bidder (exponentiations) auctioneer (exponentiations)
Scheme by Watanabe and Imai 8w + 1 5.5nw + w + 4n
Our original scheme 1.5w + 2 nw/2 + 2n+ 1
Our scheme with 1.5w + 2 w/2 + 3n+ 1
homomorphic encryption
Table 5. Efficiency comparison
Efficiency improvement in this section has no negative effect on other properties of
the scheme. After the efficiency improvement, the only thing different in all the phases
except opening phase is that homomorphic encryption algorithm must be employed.
If the homomorphic encryption algorithm is semantically secure itself (such as Pail-
lier’s), there is no compromise in these phases. In the opening phase, different opening
method is employed. However the only difference is that new opening method reveals
less information. So no achieved properties are compromised by the improvement on
computation efficiemcy.
7 Conclusion
The key chain in the scheme by Watanabe and Imai[13] is modified, so that stronger
bid privacy can be achieved in the proposed auction scheme. So far, this is the only
scheme that can achieve non-interaction, public verifiability and unconditional privacy
for losing bids at the same time. Efficiency is also improved in this scheme compared
to [13].
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A Paillier’s Encryption Scheme
Paillier’s encryption scheme is as follows.
1. Key Generation: Choose a RSA modulus N = pq, where p and q are large prime
integers. Choose an integer g so that its order αN is a multiple of N modulo N2.
The public key is N and g and the secret key is λ(N), where λ(N) = lcm(p −
1, q − 1).
2. Encryption: To encrypt a message m ∈ ZN , choose a random integer x ∈ Z∗N and
compute the ciphertext c = gMxN mod N2.
3. Decryption: To decrypt c, computeM = L(cλ(N) mod N2)/L(gλ(N) mod N2) mod
N where L : {u < N2|u = 1 mod N} → ZN and L(u) = u−1N .
